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Views on Military Intervention: The Role of Moral Hazard
Debate has raged on when and how the US should intervene in the affairs of others. Many argue that our policy of intervention has been inconsistent during the 1990s. Some argue the US has not done enough, while others argue we are doing too much.
Regardless of the perspective taken, there are no clearly articulated criteria or policy to use in determining when the US should intervene in the affairs of another state, a non-state, or a trans-national group in one instance and not in another. 1 The questions concerning intervention and flexing US power are never exactly the same and the answers are always varying shades of gray; much of the recent literature seems to describe and analyze different aspects of the problem.
This paper discusses intervention. Specifically, we evaluate the conditions under which the US should intervene in the affairs of another actor or actors with military force.
We use moral hazard theory to guide our analysis. Obviously, the US has many ways to intervene when it so chooses-economically, diplomatically, militarily, informationally, culturally, officially, unofficially, with government agencies, with non-governmental organizations, and the like. However, military intervention has been and remains the most controversial especially since the end of the Cold War.
Before proceeding, we must define some of our terms. Intervention in this paper represents coercive interference by a superior actor (principal) into the sphere of jurisdiction or influence of a weaker actor (agent). 2 Actors are nation-states, nations, states, non-state, or trans-national groups. Military force is used here to mean the hostile use of lethal power with the intent to force and compel an actor to do our will. Moral hazard occurs when an actor has incentive to take unusual risk because international or US policies provide insurance against failure.
This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, we seek to answer the question of when the US should intervene in the affairs of others. As Stephen Walt said, we are still awaiting for the "X" article to provide a compelling analysis for this new era, like Kennan did during the Cold War. 3 Second, this paper offers a new analysis of intervention based on moral hazard theory. Finally, policy-makers in the Bush-Cheney
Administration are struggling with this issue right now. Therefore, the linkage to established theory, development of a descriptive framework, and specific unit of analysis (intervention with military force) distinguishes this paper from previous studies.
What's Been Done
Much has been written on the new era. Kissinger's (1977) explanation of the Cold War's relative balance of power as "bi-polar" was a reality for many years;
however, the idea of a bi-polar world has not been relevant for almost a decade and, in any case, this description did not fully tell policy makers when to intervene with military force. Perhaps when the other major power instigated a hostile act, a direct or indirect confrontation would result and require the US to intervene. Many of the Cold War relationships could be analyzed under this rubric of bi-polarity with the rest of the world neatly aligned under one of the two sides 4 .
Since the end of the Cold War, much has been published on the "new world order"-which has been long on new and short on order. Descriptions of a uni-polar world that centered on the US were popular during the early 1990s. 5 During the mid1990s, descriptions of a multi-polar world emerged in which several nations were thought to share global influence, although along a narrow set of considerations. By the end of the 1990s, discussions on the new era were offered in terms of normative behavior among states, rather than just a balance of power. 6 However, none of these labels has taken hold because their descriptive power simply hasn't captured the full range of variables characterizing the post-Cold War era.
While much work in the early 1990s discussed international relations and balance of power in terms of polarity (uni-polar and multi-polar), the late 1990s has seen more discussion about the impact of an ever-shrinking world where globalization is frequently used to describe the new era. Globalization is more than economic interdependence. It represents the coming together of cultures and ways of life that cross borders with ease.
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There is another emerging trend where US "primacy" is used to discuss the nature of US power and position in the world. Convergence on global goals rather than balance of power or fear of escalation to somehow control world order is one policy proposal.
Although quixotic, these global goals would include less military force to resolve conflicts, reduced quantities of weapons of mass destruction, a doctrine of limited humanitarian intervention, and economic openness. 8 The primacy advocates also describe a rise of regionalism because the US will not be the world's police force, and therefore, Europe and Asia will have to shoulder more of the burden for maintaining security in their regions.
Globalism and US primacy try to describe the new era and how we fit. Diffusion rather than concentration of threats characterize this new era. It is not that threats to our physical and economic security have subsided, but instead threats are spread across many different areas and levels: states, non-states, and trans-national groups. There are not so many clear and obvious enemies, just many cloudy and potential enemies from unseen, unanticipated, or unknown circumstances.
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Regarding intervention with military force, the debate has been much more acute given the five or so US military interventions of the 1990s. Not withstanding the arguments about whether or not the United Nations charter allows for the "use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state," 10 the spectrum of when to intervene is wide. At one end of the spectrum are those who advocate the US should only intervene militarily using overwhelming force to win under clearly defined objectives when a narrowly defined set of vital interests are at stake. 11 The other end of the spectrum is held by the "humanitarian hawks" who advocate military intervention to simply save human lives whenever they are most threatened. 12 Some argue the US should intervene with military force when domestic turmoil threatens regional or international stability or when massive human rights violations occur. 13 Many agree with these criteria on when to intervene and go to the next step and define how to do it. Robert Tucker, among others, argues that the US has the responsibility to maintain world order-but by acting with partners, not alone. controllers could willfully be slow to grant take-off clearances and thereby prevent some aircraft from take off. Turkey should be insured from failure to perform for events beyond its control, yet be provided with incentive to do what it is supposed to do. This is the moral hazard dilemma, i.e., the fact that provision of insurance may dull the incentives for adequate performance, particularly when it is difficult for the principal to perfectly monitor the agent's actions and performance.
Moral hazard has been used widely in economic literature to help explain why some actors have taken risky behavior, at least partially incentivized by knowledge that another organization will come to their rescue. Mexico's shaky economy over the last two decades has worried the US enough so that it responded with economic aid. The 16 This, of course, is similar to the moral hazard problem involved with welfare -does such support dull the incentive to work?
The US creates moral hazard situations by underwriting various actions around the globe because policymakers are concerned the transmission of cross-border shocks will destabilize international security, stability, or prosperity. 17 Shock is a disturbance of the natural balance or state of being in an actor's environment that is significant enough to require action to restore a state of equilibrium. Cross-border shocks can start in one country and propagate outward like the ripples caused by a pebble dropped in a pool of water until the shock crosses the border into one or more countries. A key national interest of the US is to maintain stability by minimizing the impact of cross-border shocks to foster worldwide free trade. As the US government provides incentive and insurance for actors to undertake some level of activity to further our physical or economic well-being, moral hazard can lead these actors to take risky actions that may trigger cross-border shock. It is within this context that subsequent discussion focuses.
Discussion
It is our contention that moral hazard in this new era is driving conflicts and contingencies, and in some of these instances the US has to respond with military force to maintain regional or global stability to protect our physical and economic well-being. In the 21 st century, our vital national interests of physical and economic security are absolutely dependent on international stability-and US military forces provide insurance that many countries rely upon to protect access to and participation in global trade.
Moral hazard occurs when an actor has incentive to take unusual risk because international or US policies provide insurance against failure. This insurance is a potential trigger for cross-border shock. US and international policies have underwritten risky behavior by international actors in different ways. 18 In some cases actors are simply too large or too important for the US or international community to allow them to fail. For example, within the US, the federal government has been actively involved in the California energy crisis because the potential ripple effect from disrupted business activities there could easily cause internal US shock or cross-border shock between the US and other countries. California is the most populous state in the US and the sixthlargest economy in the world. Therefore, the implications of business failure there are tremendous. 19 Outside the US, the financial bailout of Thailand's Bhat was necessary to As shown in Figure 1 , moral hazard can be the direct or indirect trigger to transmitting cross-border shock. When the shock is severe enough to threaten regional or worse, global stability then the US should intervene. For the purposes of this discussion, the US can intervene in two different ways: with military force, which can be lethal or non-lethal, and with non-military instruments of power. Lethal combat power is the military force required to engage in direct combat with enemy forces and runs the gamut of military operations from full-scale nuclear war to peacemaking. Non-lethal military force is force not used for direct combat, but provides overall support to the military. These forces include airlift and air refueling, space satellites, security assistance, special operations forces reconnaissance teams, peacekeeping forces, or information operations.
When the US military provides humanitarian assistance to help a nation with earthquake, tornado, or some other relief, this occurs with non-lethal military force. Using lethal or non-lethal military forces constitutes military intervention. Finally, in many situations non-military intervention is a more appropriate instrument of power to flex. For example, economic and diplomatic leverage can be exercised to help stabilize a country or region before cross-border shock causes instability. The US's large military force structure and power also may be a trigger to some actors. We have the strongest military in the world, which, some believe, has made us arrogant when dealing in international issues. For example, the planned deployment of a national missile defense system, despite the vocal concerns from countries around the world, has not deterred the Bush-Cheney Administration from pursuing such a controversial program. On the other hand, other countries that resent our size and strength may be motivated to undermining our strength without a head-on confrontation. For example, some argue that Russia is still maintaining Cold War behavior against the US on many levels: spying on us, spreading negative propaganda, fragmenting US national will, or disrupting international relations, to name a few. 21 Osama bin Laden is an actor prepared to attack us in non-conventional ways to avoid our direct military strength.
Moral Hazard Can Trigger Instability
Additionally, some countries rely on the US for their security umbrella. During the Cold War and even today, many nations such as Canada, Mexico, Japan and NATO rely on the US nuclear umbrella. To these countries, our umbrella ensures their protection despite risky behavior they may take. Other countries may seek to exploit the fractions among those countries under the US security umbrella. For instance, Saddam
Hussein has leveraged the international community's waning will to continue enforcing the embargo on Iraq and frequently violated UN Security Council resolutions without retribution.
Moreover, the US population's ambivalence toward foreign policy matters, international issues, and willingness to use military force also provide a type of incentive for actors to take risky behavior that may trigger cross-border shock. Some characterize the American public's views on international affairs as "apathetic internationalism"
where the public pays lip service to foreign affairs, but does not act like it cares. 22 Our representative government is keenly in tune with furthering the interests that benefit its constituents. Unfortunately, the average constituent who has sent his or her representative to Washington has little interest in international matters. Individual freedom, security, and prosperity are keen interests; however, the relationship between those interests and international matters is not a consideration for the typical American today. Regional and global stability are simply taken for granted.
There are other potential triggers to consider. 23 Third, flexing our economic muscle continues to be a tool we are comfortable using. We gave Colombia $1.3 billion to help stem the production of drugs. Additionally, we provided billions of dollars to Russia to help with its democratic transition in the early 1990s; and, in the Horn of Africa we used economic power to quell the border dispute because of the potential impact on trade routes for diamonds, oil and other goods.
The Nature of Shock
Moral hazard provides incentives to actors to take risky behavior. Sometimes this behavior can be the trigger causing cross-border shock. Different types of shock as shown in Table 2 , reverberate throughout international communities. Of most concern are shocks that threaten American physical security and survival; fortunately, these shocks seem distant and infrequent. The shocks in Table 2 can affect areas of different priorities for the US. The first area of priority for the US is homeland security that entails protecting the US population, and infrastructure within the confines of US borders from harm or destruction from external threats. Our allies with whom we have a formal alliance are our second area of priority, like NATO countries. Third areas of priority are countries that are major trading partners or treaty signatories. The fourth areas of priority are countries that are friends but may not be alliance or treaty partners. Our security and well-being depend on these four priority areas because they all impact regional and global stability. Different types of shock will affect priority areas at different levels over time.
Military Intervention Threshold
Our response to different levels of shock can be evaluated by time horizons. The greater the impact over time, the greater the need to respond. Shocks having a potentially long-term negative impact on our well-being in any of the four priority areas should be watched carefully. A US response might be required to minimize the impact of these shocks by using economic, diplomatic, informational, or other non-traditional instruments shock is too low to cause instability and even over time, the shock never becomes great enough to cause instability (S-3). In this case, there is long-term potential impact, but no need to intervene with military force. Again intervention by other means may be appropriate.
Any contemplated intervention must be assessed for its overall value in terms of the benefits gained for the cost incurred. In the parable of the would be tower builder, he first sits down and estimates the cost to see if he has enough money to complete it. For if he lays the foundation and is not able to finish it, everyone who sees it will ridicule him. Similarly, policy makers should count the cost of any intervention based on the priority area affected prior to actually intervening. A trade off between the cost and the value gained from an intervention must be considered for several factors for each type of cross border shock that occurs. Some of these factors include the morality of the cause, risk of lives, international and domestic political risks, economic cost, support from other countries, public opinion, military readiness, environmental and cultural costs. If the cumulative benefits of these factors outweigh the cost, then intervention is appropriate.
Part of this analysis must include assessing if the particular type of intervention is appropriate to yield the desired results. Military intervention is probably not the best method to stop the spread of hoof and mouth disease to the US, whereas a ban on imported livestock from infected countries might be. Conversely, sending in the military to defend our NATO allies from an imminent attack is more appropriate than trade embargo against the attacker.
When instability becomes significant enough to adversely impact on our physical and economic security, or severe enough to disrupt global economic exchanges, then the US should intervene with military force. Security and stability of international trade routes (physical and cyber) are paramount to maintaining world prosperity and ultimately US well-being. For example, the US has a strategic interest in the Horn of Africa because of its impact on trade routes. Alternatively, the US Space Commission's report, said that the US has a vital national interest in freedom of navigation of space orbits. The question, from the commission's perspective, was not a matter of "if" putting weapons in space was right, but rather a question of "when" the need to protect those orbits would be required. Any disruption of our space-based assets would quickly be destabilizing (such as an exo-atmospheric nuclear detonation).
Because interconnectivity leads to interdependence, any regional instability is hard to isolate. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
As the most powerful nation on earth, many reasons exist why the US can and should intervene in the affairs of another actor. We have described conditions when the US should intervene with military force. In short, when regional or global instability is threatened by the transmission of cross-border shock, the US should intervene because our physical or economic well-being and prosperity would be adversely affected.
On the other hand, the US to intervene in the might have reason to intervene in the affairs of another actor when our physical or economic well-being is not directly at stake. Events can occur causing shock within the borders of another country, yet not threaten regional stability. As we mentioned before, natural disasters are not shocks caused by moral hazard situations. However, as the world's most powerful and richest nation, we are obligated to try to help ease widespread human suffering. In these cases, we should use the best form of intervention to quickly ease suffering and restore order to the area affected whether military or other intervention. Likewise, there are cases when helping our allies requires US assistance to show our support such as the US assistance to Great Britain during the Falklands War. Both of these examples illustrate cases when our strategic interests are not at stake, but we should respond with military force to satisfy our obligations as a good global neighbor.
Moral hazard provides a new method of evaluating national security issues and causes of crisis situations. As US foreign policy decisions are formulated, they should be evaluated for the moral hazard they provide to various actors around the world. As we have seen, a policy developed with the best intentions to solve or prevent one problem have actually led to another, unanticipated problem. By assessing beforehand the incentive our actions or policies provide to others to engage in risky behavior, we may be able to minimize the number of cross-border shocks impacting regional and global stability. When moral hazard is viewed through the three lenses of international order, realism, idealism and constructivism, intervention and military intervention in particular, will be used only when absolutely necessary. As Stephen Walt says diplomats, "must remain cognizant of realism's emphasis on the inescapable role of power, keep liberalism's awareness of domestic forces in mind and occasionally reflect on constructivism's vision of change." 25
